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ABSTRACT
Crimmigration in Slovenia
The article discusses “crimmigration” (i.e. the criminalization of migration) in Slove-
nia. It evaluates elements of crimmigration in the legal framework, institutions and 
policies. The analysis of the framing of the topic at the normative level of institutions 
is accompanied by an examination of the implementation of specific procedures in 
practice. An exploration of policies and expert opinions is combined with an analysis 
of the effects that crimmigration has on migrants. Corroborated with the migrants’ 
experience with crimmigration measures, the article concludes that migration poli-
cy in Slovenia is becoming stricter and progressively headed in the direction of in-
creased criminalization of migration.
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IZVLEČEK
Krimigracije v Sloveniji
Avtorici v članku obravnavata »krimigracijo« (tj. kriminalizacijo migracij) v Sloveniji. 
Raziskujeta elemente kriminalizacije migracij v pravnem okviru, institucijah in poli-
tikah. Uokvirjanje tematike na normativni ravni institucij analizirata skupaj s pregle-
dom izvajanja konkretnih postopkov v praksi, analizo političnih in strokovnih mnenj 
pa združujeta z analizo učinkov, ki jih imajo krimigracije na migrant(k)e. Ugotavljata, 
da izkušnje oseb, ki migrirajo, s krimigracijskimi ukrepi potrjujejo, da migracijska po-
litika v Sloveniji, tudi kot posledica izvajanja smernic EU, postaja strožja in vedno bolj 
usmerjena v povečevanje kriminalizacije migracij.
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INTRODUCTION
Around the world and especially within the European Union, governments of 
various stripes have become increasingly quick to deploy criminal justice mea-
sures to address the “immigration problem”. Existing practices of migration control 
“disrupt traditional frames of understanding within criminal law and criminology” 
(Franko Aas 2016: 21), as many national jurisdictions have adopted increasingly 
restrictive immigration control systems. State borders are subject to increased 
militarization, progressive securitization and ever-more high-tech surveillance. 
The convergence of immigration and criminal law has therefore been identified 
as the most important contemporary development in immigration law (Stumpf 
2006). While immigration policies are increasingly based on exclusion and denial 
of rights with the purpose of control over migrants, migration law is taking on 
elements of criminal law, which researchers have termed the criminalization of 
migration or “crimmigration”.
Both criminal and immigration law are, at their core, systems of inclusion and exclu-
sion. They are similarly designed to determine whether and how to include indivi-
duals as members of society or exclude them from it. Both create insiders and out-
siders. Both are designed to create distinct categories of people – innocent versus 
guilty, admitted versus excluded or, as some say, “legal” versus “illegal”. (ibid.: 380)
It may seem that current crimmigration trends are a novelty in migration policy, 
with a rising number of people, most notably politicians, media personalities and 
even academics claiming that we are witnessing a global migration crisis. Indeed, in 
recent years the debate about managing migration has shifted to the top of politi-
cal agenda, yet immigration control has been an important issue in Britain since the 
late 1950s and in the rest of Western Europe since the mid-1970s (Castels 2010). While 
it is possible to observe a series of “migration crises” across the world, speaking of 
a global crisis is a vocabulary used by immigration sceptics and opponents, who 
reduce the disourse on the migration phenomenon to terminology such as burden, 
threat, security, risk, and control. In this way, migrations are increasingly considered 
solely in terms of “management” of people on the move, who in consequence have 
become de-personalized as “flows” in need of being at least properly channelled, if 
not stopped entirely. As a consequence, countries that have developed
generally rights-sensitive standards and procedures for assessing protection claims 
of asylum seekers within their jurisdictions have simultaneously established barriers 
that prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from setting foot on their territo-
ries or otherwise triggering protection obligations. Consequently, those who would 
otherwise have been able to avail themselves of asylum procedures, social support, 
and decent reception conditions are often relegated to countries of first arrival or 
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transit that have comparatively less capacity to ensure protection of human rights in 
accordance with international standards. (Frelick et al. 2016: 190–191)
At the same time, the more nation-states and various supra-national bodies such 
as the EU attempt to control migration, the more the gap seems to be growing 
between the aims and actual results of national migration policies. “Undoc-
umented migration, entry of asylum seekers and the formation of new ethnic 
communities all seem to be driven by forces which governments cannot control” 
(Castels 2010: 205).
A rise in hate speech against migrants, and in particular Muslims, has been ap-
parent. This is especially the case when taking into consideration the 2015 “refugee 
crisis” in the EU, although the situation has been deteriorating for people seeking 
asylum since the 1980s (Peters 2007). Decision-makers justify their actions that ex-
clude a growing number of individuals from society through scapegoating tactics 
of nationalist and racist prejudice, which instill fear of immigration, even though 
the research shows hardly any evidence of an immigration-crime nexus. “Migration 
and asylum seeking are increasingly perceived as phenomena that cause security 
concerns, and therefore have to be addressed by way of control and punishment” 
(Kogovšek Šalamon 2017: 251). Using immigration and criminal law as a means of 
exclusion, an ever-expanding group of outsiders is being denied the basic privileges 
that are only bestowed upon citizens (Stumpf 2006). Operating in the intersection 
between criminal and immigration law, migrants are increasingly constructed as 
“symbolic assailants” (Jiang, Erez 2018) with threatening consequences for their fun-
damental rights. Detention, expulsion and deterrence have become a predominant 
policy response to migration (Kogovšek Šalamon 2017: 252), reported to increasingly 
result in the inability to even claim asylum in the EU. Since the latter has also become 
a burning issue in Slovenia recently, with pushbacks reported in the Western Balkans 
that are leading to an increasing number of human rights violations (Regvar 2018), it 
is necessary to examine this issue more closely.
Studies problematizing asylum and deportation policies (Kogovšek Šalamon 
2011; Zorn 2014), integration, social and labour market policies (Pajnik, Bajt 2011), 
attest to the constriction and discriminatory effects of migration policies in Slove-
nia. However, there are no analyses that systematically study migration policies in 
Slovenia from the perspective of crimmigration, let alone employ a critical com-
parative perspective with the country’s international law commitments. There is a 
lack of analysis of procedures related to crimmigration, such as border control and 
deportations. Highlighting the continuity in the way in which the outsiders have 
been framed as Others and governed throughout the centuries, we focus on Slo-
venia as a case study.1 No crimmigration research exists in Slovenia, thus the paper 
1 Weber and Bowling (2008), for instance, describe the 18th century laws in the UK that restrict-
ed the mobility of “masterless men”, paupers and beggars, while history is full of examples of 
excluding the Other, most notably Jews and Roma.
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serves as an initial comprehensive overview of the current situation. Our approach 
to the criminalization of migration is sociological and focuses on “discoursive crim-
migration” (Parkin 2013). We are not interested in scholarship that examines the is-
sue of “migrant criminality”, as our concern is with the societal trend of constructing 
migrants as symbolic assailants, particularly in view of their constructed Otherness. 
Rather than merely providing an account of existing laws, policies and procedures, 
we therefore seek to understand the consequences of increased deployment of 
criminal justice measures to address the “immigration problem” as they manifest in 
socio-economic exclusion and the denial of migrants’ human rights.
METHOD AND OUTLINE
The paper draws on interviews conducted with the main actors involved in crimmi-
gration procedures: key stakeholders such as state representatives, non-governmen-
tal organizations and migrants.2 The situations and experiences of migrants are very 
different; some entered Slovenia legally, some irregularly. In this way, we are able to 
associate policy measures as envisioned by state actors with their immediate effects 
both in the form of implementation by public employees in charge of enforcing the 
law (e.g. the police) and in the form of crimmigration consequences as experienced 
by the target of its measures – the migrants themselves. We employ desk analysis 
of policies and the interview analysis method. Empirically, the paper draws on 12 
detailed semi-structured interviews conducted between November 2017 and April 
2018 with main actors involved in crimmigration procedures (see Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1: Migrants 
Pseudonym Gender Age Year of arrival in Slovenia
Country of 
birth Status
Samar female 23 2016 Syria Refugee 
Amine male 23 2015 Algeria Asylum  seeker
Peter male 47 2010 Jamaica Permanent residence
Aisha female 33 2016 Morocco Temporary residence
Esek male 22 2017 Eritrea Refugee
Zahim male 29 2014 Afghanistan Asylum  seeker
2 For the purpose of greater clarity we adopt official terminology where needed but use the gen-
eral term “migrant” to signify the mobility of people as free agents beyond their ascribed status.
Veronika BAJT, Mojca FRELIH
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Table 2: Stakeholders
Sector Date of interview
INT1 Ministry of the Interior 28. 03. 2018 
INT2 Ministry of the Interior 16. 04. 2018
INT3 Ministry of the Interior 16. 02. 2018
INT4 Police 21. 02. 2018
INT5 Police 26. 01. 2018
INT6 Civil society 23. 11. 2017
The first section provides an overview of discoursive crimmigration, followed by elu-
cidating Slovenia’s priorities in terms of migration management and control in the 
second section. The third section summarizes the main consequences of crimmi-
gration in Slovenia, concluding that the wider EU framework is essential for under-
standing the current state of affairs, as well as the best predictor of future trends in 
this regard.
DISCOURSIVE CRIMMIGRATION
The criminalization of migrants (and ethnic minorities) includes “all the discourses, 
facts and practices made by the police, judicial authorities, but also local govern-
ments, media, and a part of the population that hold immigrants/aliens responsible 
for a large share of criminal offences” (Palidda 2011: 23). Considering the overrep-
resentation of non-nationals and ethnic minorities in the criminal justice systems 
of European member states on the one hand and public perceptions increasingly 
linking migrants to crime on the other, there is a conspiquous “lack of any concrete 
empirical evidence substantiating a correlation between immigration figures and 
crime rates” (Parkin 2013: 2). Research (Palidda 2011) found no links between the 
intensification of criminalisation trends in specific national contexts and increasing 
crime rates or immigration, meaning no “correlation in the criminalisation of aliens 
and rises in crime” could be confirmed, yet interestingly “periods of economic dif-
ficulty often see the fiercest proliferation of criminalisation discourses and surges 
of xenophobia” (Parkin 2013: 3). In Slovenia, a rise in xenophobia and anti-immigra-
tion hate speech has been linked to the socio-economic effects of the 2008/2009 
financial crisis (Pajnik, Bajt 2010). Moreover, research confirms that most immigrants 
integrate, yet factors such as proliferation of immigration-related criminal offen ces 
and discriminatory treatment by police (e.g. ethnic profiling) artificially amplify the 
statistical representation of migrants and minorities in criminal activities (Parkin 
Crimmigration in Slovenia
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2013: 2). Analysing the discoursive aspect of criminalisation thus facilitates an under-
standing of the complex social and political conditions that allow the construction 
of migrants as symbolic assailants.
Moreover, the ways in which the media portray migrants, combined with a polit-
ical rhetoric of fear, lead to actual crimmigration policies. The discursive dimension 
of the criminalization of migration therefore exceeds the field of criminal law, refer-
ring to the way in which the rhetoric on immigration and security constructs the 
idea of fear/threat which is automatically associated with migrants as deviant and 
immigration as a security risk (Maneri 2011). Consequently, migrants are constructed 
as threatening the social order, “our” jobs and wellbeing, which therefore warrants 
strict(er) immigration control regimes (Provine, Doty 2011). The role of the mass me-
dia perpetuates crimmigration in society and negatively affects public opinion and 
the legal certainty of migrants. In particular, social media platforms enable an un-
precedented fast spreading of fake news, using prejudice in order to disperse the 
politics of fear and creating a constant state of anxiety through media panic that 
reduces public space for a competent and critical assessment of migration policies. 
At the same time, “media logic” follows political agendas, as the media favour dom-
inant sources, in particular the political and economic elites, who thence obtain a 
platform for the dissemination of dogmatic, populist and nationalist statements (Pajnik 
2017). While the media in Slovenia was paying full attention to refugee arrivals dur-
ing the first two months of the 2015 “refugee crisis”, for example, migration started 
disappearing from the news as well as from public discourse, only to reappear in 
time for the parliamentary electoral campaign in the spring of 2018. The media spec-
tacle of the first few weeks of the 2015 mass migration was exceptionally similar to 
any other crisis reporting and helped instil fear and intolerance among the Slovenian 
public. Without the media coverage, most residents of Slovenia would have no idea 
refugees were even in the country, since their contact with the local population was 
restricted to a bare minimum (Kogovšek Šalamon, Bajt 2015).
Space limitations here preclude an analysis of the role of the media in strength-
ening crimmigration, but ample research confirms the immense importance of ana-
lysing the mediatization of migration (Maneri 2011; Pajnik 2017), i.e. how the media 
report on migration, how they select sources, who speaks in the media and why, 
what is the editing policy concerning the issue of migration and what is the impact 
of the media on public opinion and consequently on the drafting of legal provisions. 
Suffice it here to note that the mass media play an important role in crimmigration, 
creating media panic through hegemonic discourse that is problematically focused 
on national security in case of the arrival of migrants, thus creating and consequent-
ly exercising public pressure that pushes for stricter legal regulation, strengthening 
of border control and lack of readiness to assist people in need.
Veronika BAJT, Mojca FRELIH
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MANAGING MIGRATION
When researching migration management priorities, one must take into account 
that “migration processes are of a long-term nature, while the policy-cycle is essen-
tially short-term and often determined by the length of electoral periods” (Castels 
2010: 223). In addition,
the declared objectives of states are often quite misleading. They are driven both 
by the need to maintain legitimacy and the unwillingness to face up to past policy 
failures. Policies that claim to exclude undocumented workers may often really be 
about allowing them in through side doors and back doors, so that they can be more 
readily exploited. (ibid.)
Refugees started arriving in Slovenia in increased numbers in September 2015, and 
when Hungary’s borders were finally closed, they could enter Austria only from 
Slovenia. Using this “corridor”, according to the official police statistics, 396,240 mi-
grants entered Slovenia between 17 September 2015 and 7 January 2016. Since only 
a handful of them applied for asylum and almost none were successfully returned by 
the police, almost the same number of people left Slovenia heading for Austria and 
other western and northern European countries. The total number of applicants for 
international protection in Slovenia in 2018 was 1,430 (1,304 men and 126 women), 
but only 53 persons received international protection status.
According to data from the Government Office for the Support and Integration 
of Migrants, on 29 October 2018 there were 641 people with recognised internation-
ally protected status in Slovenia, 278 asylum seekers (most of whom were housed at 
the Asylum centre), and 97 persons were waiting to file an application (UOIM 2018). 
The police statistical data shows that there were 1,930 irregular migrants apprehend-
ed in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia in 2017, and the number increased from 
1 January to 30 September 2018 to 6,667 “unauthorised border crossings” (Policija 
2018: 1). In regard to crimmigration processes, the police identified
693 violations committed by foreigners who had illegally entered Slovenia on its in-
ternal border without possessing a proper travel document or permit (e.g. residence 
permit or visa). The corresponding figure last year was 739. This represents a 6.2 per 
cent decrease in comparison with the same period last year” (ibid.: 2).
These numbers indicate the primary criminal charges related solely to migration. 
The combination of migration and criminal law thus leads to increased representa-
tion of migrants in prisons and in public discourse, which serves as additional evi-
dence of higher criminality of immigrants (Učakar 2017: 60).
Crimmigration in Slovenia
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It is impossible to analyse Slovenia’s crimmigration policies and practices without 
first highlighting its role as an EU member state that borders Italy, Austria, Hungary 
and Croatia. The border with Croatia is a Schengen border that Slovenia is bound 
to uphold and protect. Examining the elements of criminalization of migration as 
they appear in the legal framework, institutions and policies in Slovenia, is therefore 
entwined with their accord (or lack thereof) with EU and international norms. The 
Aliens Act and its amendments (last changed in 2017) refers to removal of an alien, 
seizure of an alien’s travel document, irregular border crossing, assistance in irreg-
ular border crossing, irregular retention in the country and identification. Irregular 
border crossing and assistance with irregular border crossing are also covered by 
the State Border Control Act and some aggravated forms also in the Penal Code and 
its amendments, where the severity of the punishments for these criminal offenses 
was increased in the most recent changes that were made in 2017. According to the 
Minister of the Interior, some of the most recent changes were made in response to 
the European Commission’s initiative that Slovenia would become a new hotspot 
(MMC 2017). Hotspot means that all the responsible EU agencies (e.g. Frontex, Eu-
ropol, Eurojust) work on the ground with the authorities of frontline member states 
facing disproportionate migratory pressures along the EU’s external borders. The 
idea is to help them fulfil their obligations under EU law and swiftly identify, register 
and fingerprint incoming migrants. Faced with this prospect, Slovenia’s authorities 
described the situation from 2015 onward as a “full red alert” (ibid.), and adopted 
legal measures that would safeguard Slovenia from ever again becoming a hotspot. 
Mirroring measures adopted over the past three years by neighbouring Hungary 
and Austria, in January 2017 Slovenia approved a bill that allows police to seal the 
border with Croatia. Under the new legislation, Slovenian authorities can reject asy-
lum seekers directly at the frontier with non-Schengen member Croatia in case of a 
new influx of migrants which could “threaten public order and internal security.” The 
Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior stated at the time that it was an “extreme 
measure” that the government had to draft in case it would ever be needed again 
(ibid.). Such fear-inducing tactics were augmented a month later at the EU Malta 
summit, where the head of Slovenian government warned that a new migration 
route had opened across the Adriatic Sea towards Istria, even though the data of the 
Slovenian and Croatian police did not confirm this (Gaube 2017).
Migration policy in Slovenia is centralized, since most of the measures are im-
plemented at the level of the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for asylum 
and migration.3 A number of other ministries are also involved, each in the imple-
mentation of individual procedures related to its departmental jurisdiction. Local 
3 In July 2017, a special Government Office for the Support and Integration of Migrants (sl.: 
Urad vlade za oskrbo in integracijo migrantov – UOIM) was established, taking over part of 
responsibilities that were previously under the authority of the ministry. Devising policies 
and administrative procedures for obtaining the status of international protection remain 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.
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communities do not have formal power to implement asylum and migration meas-
ures, though integration is in actuality conducted at the local community level and 
sustained by various non-governmental sector programmes. Slovenia as an EU mem-
ber state actively participates in EU migration policymaking and in the implementa-
tion of EU legislation. The migration management system comprises criminalization, 
including sanctions for irregular border crossing, (joint) expulsions, and restriction of 
movement as primary criminal charges. Below, we identify three key points regarding 
Slovenia’s migration policy as they relate to the theme of crimmigration.
Migration Policy Priorities
According to the analysis of the policy and the analysis of the interviews that we 
conducted, Slovenia tries not to stand out in terms of the European average, and 
mainly follows the lead of other countries. The interviewees note that no specific 
policy goals or priorities exist and that positions shift and priorities are created ad 
hoc. While migration policy, if one can be said to have existed prior to the events of 
2015/16, was stagnant and no major problems were identified on the part of state 
officials, the “refugee crisis” changed all that:
First we saw something like a humanitarian approach, but then we went into state 
protection, so the fence was a priority […] Nobody is setting any special priorities 
in this broader sense, it is actually just a response to the current situation […] There 
is no migration policy in Slovenia at all. With this wave of 2015/16, when many mi-
grants came, it seems to me that some positive movements occurred due to the 
fact that individual institutions began to realize “ah, we have refugees in Slovenia” – 
although refugees have been in Slovenia since 1995. This may have been a positive 
shift that at least one started to think differently, to look for some systemic or at least 
temporary solutions, improvements. On the other hand, there was the negative shift 
of polarization of Slovenia, the criminalization of this population. (INT2)
In terms of legal immigration, economic migration can be recognized as Slovenia’s 
priority in respect of the need for a migrant workforce in certain sectors due to 
labour demand, most notably in construction. The number of new work and res-
idence permits issued is high every year, especially among citizens of the former 
Yugoslav republics. However, a proactive migration policy that would address the 
shrinking numbers of the working-age population is not a priority, despite listing 
integration as a keyword. “Integration is definitely a priority which has been repeat-
edly expressed […] As far as illegal immigration is concerned, the Western Balkans is 
a priority by building the capacities of the countries on the natural pathway of illegal 
immigration through Slovenia.” (INT1)
Crimmigration in Slovenia
16
D V E  D O M O V I N I  •  T W O  H O M E L A N D S  •  4 9  •  2 0 1 9
The Slovenian police are actively involved in Frontex operations and implement 
wider EU immigration control policies, but the state’s emphasis is primarily on the 
regional neighbourhood, especially since the 2015 events that brought the Balkan 
route into focus:
The European Union was really very inefficient with its measures. The fact is that 
legislation was simply not adapted to the situation that we were faced with. At that 
moment we really saw the importance of regional cooperation. Of course, in our 
case regional cooperation doesn’t only mean cooperation with EU member states 
but regional cooperation for us is chiefly cooperation with Balkan countries. (INT1)
The EU and Schengen
Based on the European Union treaties, migration legislation and policy are in the 
domain of the European Union. After the Treaty of Lisbon, both the EU Council and 
the European Parliament act as decision-makers, while the European Commission is 
the body that proposes measures at the European Union level. In 2016, the European 
Commission presented a reform legislation package, i.e. a set of changes to the Com-
mon European Asylum System. The proposed statutes underwent various negotiation 
stages, where the recasting of Dublin Regulation is the most important, suggesting 
a potential new crisis management mechanism for situations where one or more EU 
member states are facing “challenging circumstances” or “severe crisis”. From this per-
spective, a (re)new(ed) legislative framework is being developed in the EU.
The decision-making process in Brussels has changed a lot since the 2016 migra-
tion crisis. The European Commission used to have greater weight with its proposals 
which it ultimately implemented. But during the crisis this role was taken over by 
the European Council. And the actual decisions were very political. And here’s a twist 
from before when it was the technocracy who knew the legislative framework, who 
were preparing things. But now, this political takeover through legal mechanisms, 
it greatly influences the way things operate in Brussels. So, in my opinion, unfortu-
nately, we do not get anywhere with certain ideas because they simply cannot be 
accepted politically. (INT1)
Due to Slovenia’s geographic position, its southern border with Croatia is now a 
Schengen border, and this fact governs its foreign policy in terms of asylum and 
overall migration management.
In all documents, Slovenia stands for the protection of the external borders of the 
European Union. And no distinctions are made between the external Schengen bor-
der and the EU’s external border. Slovenia always emphasizes the need to protect 
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the borders on the external boundary of the EU. It is clear which borders this refers 
to. (INT1)
Formally, Slovenia claims to be in favour of mutual solidarity among member states, 
as demonstrated by its participation in the relocation mechanism which was estab-
lished as a consequence of the “migration crisis”. It has recently joined the reset-
tlement programme, and data show that out of its legal commitment to host 567 
people, 253 persons were relocated to Slovenia by July 2018 (81 from Italy and 172 
from Greece). One of our interviewees, a 23-year-old woman, started in Syria togeth-
er with her family. Her story reveals a typical Balkan migratory route: first they went 
to Turkey and continued to Greece by boat. Eventually they travelled to Macedonia, 
and were finally transferred to Slovenia based on the EU quota system:
It was really, really bad where we lived. We lived in Aleppo, where there was a lot of 
bombing. We left everything […] we wanted to go to Germany because in Syria we 
heard that Germany had opened the borders for refugees. We didn’t know any other 
country. We had never heard of Slovenia before […] We came to Turkey, after that we 
went to Greece by boat […] It was very difficult and really bad. When we came, my 
baby was 14 days old. He was crying a lot, very scared and it was really dangerous 
[…] We stayed in Greece for 9 months. We stayed in a tent at the border for 3 months 
and they didn’t open the border […] The government in Greece said that all refugees 
will go to other countries when they open the border […] In Macedonia it was really, 
really bad […] [The officials] would just ask “when and why did you come” [...] They 
wrote my name, my children’s names and they took pictures. After two months they 
called and said “you will go to Slovenia”. (Samar)
With regard to the European Commission’s plans to redistribute refugees throughout 
the EU, which caused a major rift inside the union, Slovenia shifted its stance from 
voluntary to mandatory acceptance of the refugee quota among member states.
Political Climate and Pushbacks
Developments at the EU level run in parallel with national events. Especially the 
pre-election periods in member states show there is a lot of emphasis on migration 
policy and refugees, as well as debates on integration and a tendency to delimit 
people who need protection and those who allegedly do not and are seen as cheats 
(i.e. “economic migrants”). The shift of the debate on migration is visible and has 
been observed in all our neighbouring countries that have already had elections, 
i.e. Austria, Italy and Hungary. Migrations were also one of the central pre-election 
themes in Slovenia during the spring and summer of 2018, and the role of politics in 
migration policy creation is clear.
Crimmigration in Slovenia
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The amendment to the International Protection Act was primarily the result of 
adapting to the European acquis and was not conditioned or encouraged by nation-
al policies, though “certain solutions” that were introduced at the time it was amend-
ed “may be the result of a political environment of the time” (INT1). An analysis of the 
existing policies shows that in theory an individual has the right to access the asylum 
procedure and claim protection in EU member states. However, the definition of a 
refugee has become too narrow for all the groups that seek refuge from threatening 
circumstances or wish to escape from economic exploitation and despair. The 2015 
“refugee crisis” is a reflection of the inability of the state and international law to pro-
vide protection for all those in need. All EU member states have ratified the Geneva 
Convention and are bound by EU asylum and migration law, which sets forth basic 
guarantees for people seeking protection. However, in practice, access to asylum is 
difficult and most people are forced to attempt to access the EU territory by means 
of irregular entry. This is to say that legal access to the territory has become practi-
cally impossible.
With the mass migration of autumn 2015, Slovenia had found itself in a complete-
ly new situation in which the normative framework in place in the field of migration 
could no longer function. The government’s insistance on the strict implementation 
of the legal rules that were generally in place for such situations was completely 
inappropriate for the increased arrivals of people who desperately wanted to move 
on, crossing Slovenia on their way from Turkey/Greece/Western Balkans towards 
Germany. Eventually, the government had no other recourse but to implement a 
practice that already existed in Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia – a humanitarian “cor-
ridor”. In this way, the state allowed people to enter Slovenia and receive basic recep-
tion conditions but continue their travels towards Austria, even if they were without 
documents (for a detailed analysis see Kogovšek Šalamon 2017). At the same time, 
the governmental discourse turned into one of the “security” of local people and 
their property and the “protection” of national interests. The humanitarian aspect of 
the “refugee crisis”, to which the government discourse was at least still paying lip 
service in August 2015, was gone within a month and has not returned since, being 
progressively and steadily replaced by crimmigration measures and anti-migration 
rhetoric that is stronger than ever in 2018. Moreover, viewing migrants as symbolic 
assailants has become a pervasive stance among public servants whose work puts 
them in close proximity of crimmigration practices as part of their job. A border po-
lice officer thus reflects:
If you permit free circulation across [borders], in a year, two, three, there’d be chaos 
in Europe, in Slovenia. Europe can help, but it can’t help in a way that the whole of 
Asia, Middle East, Africa move here and live on social transfers. It’s impossible. It’s 
simple: each country can help a portion of people when in real need, but not the 
whole continent, no.
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While aware that it is not the police prerogative to resolve asylum applications, 
having been in contact with many migrants, our interviewee feels he knows the 
actual situation:
After so many years we see who is justified and who isn’t entitled. So, there’s abuse, 
exploitation, asylum is being exploited. The problem is that then it’s those who 
need it the most who must either wait too long or don’t even get it because of oth-
ers who are basically exploiting it. And they are all, almost everyone is exploiting 
it now. (INT5)
It is in fact not uncommon for public servants to speak of “asylum shopping”, which 
testifies to the official stance towards migrants as devious. Even more problematic, 
for migrants who have the right to international protection from persecution and 
serious human rights violations, so-called pushbacks stand in the way of seeking 
protection and enjoying their right to an individual assessment of their claims. Push-
backs are happening in various ways, but brutality, intimidation and devious tactics 
by authorities have been widely documented to engender a climate of fear and mis-
trust amongst people on the move. In 2018, reports about pushbacks in Slovenia 
also appeared (Amnesty International 2018; Regvar 2018; Videmšek 2018). The Om-
budsman’s office also found cases where the personal circumstances of migrants 
who might be able to apply for asylum were ignored or not seriously considered by 
the police in the process of apprehending irregular border crossers (MMC 2018).
Amnesty International and PIC both reported that in June 2018 the Slovenian au-
thorities restricted access to asylum and forced the return of several migrants. Data 
was obtained in Velika Kladuša and Bihać in Bosnia from witnesses who, although 
they wanted to claim asylum in Slovenia, were returned to the Croatian authorities. 
Unlike the Slovenian police, the Croatian authorities do not enact a formal return to 
Bosnia but simply drive the migrants to the vicinity of the border and leave them 
there; reports indicate that they are forced to cross the border. Official police sta-
tistics confirm a change in practice in June 2018: despite the fact that the number 
of people who crossed the border in an illicit manner decreased, returns to Croatia 
increased markedly. At the same time, the number of people who were recorded by 
the police as having expressed the intention to apply for asylum fell drastically. Since 
the situation for refugees in Bosnia is worrisome, the NGO watchdogs conclude that 
Slovenia is in breach of the non-refoulement principle (Regvar 2018).
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMMIGRATION
Research shows that border control intensifies at times of structural change when in-
stitutions capable of preserving the emerging economic and social order are largely 
absent (Weber and Bowling 2008). In a globally mobile society, “suspect citizens” 
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(ibid.) and outsiders, such as migrants, are the most likely to be earmarked for exclu-
sion. “This designation links historical conceptions of ‘the other’ with the tropes of 
race, class and foreignness to underpin contemporary xeno-racism” (ibid.: 355).
The previous section noted that understanding the wider EU framework is essen-
tial for understanding the current state of affairs regarding crimmigration trends in 
Slovenia: “All of a sudden they started to cut some rights and [Slovenia] blindly fol-
lowed: “yes, we also need to do something” and they unnecessarily abolished the one-
time monetary assistance [to refugees], which was the key to starting integration, that 
someone could make this transition. And this was a purely political decision” (INT2).
Even though state authorities describe current migration policy trends as in-
creasing the rights of asylum seekers and other migrants in terms of more emphasis 
placed on integration measures, members of civil society, migration researchers and 
public servants with actual field experience oppose this view by elucidating many 
areas of tightened control and clamping down on migrant rights. Officially, at least 
12 people have died so far attempting to cross the border (Videmšek 2018). Many in-
terview respondents believe that general migration and refugee policy is becoming 
more stringent. “Generally I could say yes, yes, it’s getting stricter and … of course 
politicians always use it for their own purposes” (INT2). Crossing the border into Slo-
venia, both physically and in terms of stricter control, has clearly become more dif-
ficult. “Ever since the migrant crisis it has been getting more difficult, the very act 
of crossing the border is harder; with the closing of the borders and with actions of 
other states” (INT5). At the same time, states have improved cross-border coopera-
tion with the aim of better border policing and adhering to the Dublin convention.
Asylum is getting harder to get. There are many more checks. In Slovenia it’s getting 
worse. Maybe they don’t say this on TV, but it’s getting harder. They first put up a 
fence. Now they made this centre in Brežice, the EU gave the money. In this centre 
we now have a police officer who has 4 monitors, and the 4 monitors are divided into 
4 images, 16 cameras. (INT5)
On the other hand, the official stance is that migration and asylum policy are not 
becoming stricter:
I think it’s hard to talk about becoming stricter. Certain measures within migration 
policy show that the EU, and so also Slovenia, began to realize that it’s better for 
everyone, including those arriving legally, to have regulated immigration and, on 
the other hand, a reduction of illegal immigration. Because we cannot stop it, we’ll 
never be able to stop it … The set of rights, protection, legal remedies in certain 
procedures, these are only increasing. The policies are not becoming stricter, so this 
is forcing some countries that are most affected to adopt certain actions or measures 
that are intended to suppress or restrict [migration]. But this remains at the national 
level, there are definitely no policies of aggravation at the EU level. (INT1)
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State officials like to say that “things are also changing for the benefit of foreigners 
and refugees” (INT3). And watchdog organizations and several migration research-
ers would agree that legal framework in Slovenia is “good in many respects” (INT6). 
However, while matters seem fine on paper and some procedures also run smooth-
ly in practice, there are still many shortcomings that make the system problematic. 
Lengthy procedures in processing asylum applications are one such example, as are 
inconsistencies in judicial decisions that make decisions on asylum applications “a 
lottery” (ibid.), which makes counselling a difficult task, since outcomes are extreme-
ly unpredictable: “One really big problem is asylum backlogs, which have come to 
the fore due to the increased number of applications. But the problem of slow deci-
sion making already existed before” (ibid.).
The bureacratic obstacles experienced by migrants have been widely docu-
mented (Pajnik and Bajt 2010), and are also confirmed by our interviewees. Aisha 
from Morocco reported having trouble extending her documents. Even though she 
had a Schengen visa, she faced various obstacles in arranging her residency after 
getting married in Slovenia. She notes there was a period she had to live in Slovenia 
illegally. Peter from Jamaica also shared his experiences with official procedures: “l 
realised that it’s a very difficult place to live if you are a foreigner. This society is very 
discriminative.” Conversely, Esek started his migration from Eritrea, passing Ethio-
pia, Sudan, Libya, Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria. 
In comparison, his first impression of Slovenia and its procedures was good: “I can 
say it’s really good and people friendlier than in other countries.” He was imprisoned 
in Austria and his assessment of restriction of movement succinctly sums up what 
crimmigration is all about – criminalizing people for the mere act of migrating: “It 
was in Austria because I escaped to countries without documents. This is the system, 
a really very bad system in Europe … Immigrants, they don’t do anything, you know. 
Like me, I did nothing, I don’t sell drugs, I don’t do anything [wrong]. They just put 
me in prison, you know, because of a very bad system in Europe (Esek).
One interviewee presented himself primarily as a person, a human being, re-
gardless of his current status or birth country. He entered Slovenia irregulary (by 
train) after attempting to reach Italy for the fourth time. He notes having very good 
experiences with the border police, despite being captured, and sums up his human 
existence, formally bound by crimmigration measures, perfectly: “My life is actually 
outside these walls” (Amine).
CONCLUSION
The paper is an attempt to fill a gap in crimmigration research in Slovenia, serving 
as a first comprehensive overview of the current situation. Rather than researching 
“migrant criminality”, our approach to the criminalization of migration was sociolog-
ical and our focus was on the societal trends of constructing migrants as symbolic 
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assailants. Analysing the consequences of increased deployment of criminal justice 
measures to address the “immigration problem”, the paper emphasizes how they 
reproduce socio-economic exclusion and the denial of migrants’ human rights. We 
examine whether migration policy in Slovenia is becoming stricter in the direction 
of increased criminalization of migration and to what extent these trends may be a 
consequence of the implementation of wider EU policies, arguing that understand-
ing the wider EU framework is essential for understanding the current state of affairs, 
as well as the best predictor of future trends. We show how the political leadership 
and competent institutions in Slovenia reproduce crimmigration on the basis of ide-
ologemes of national security, the protection of the “local” population, and the in-
compatibility of migrants as different, as outsiders. In doing so, the paper concludes 
that the implementation of crimmigration policies such as border control and push-
backs have discriminatory effects that augment the rightlessness of migrants. In the 
context of the role of Slovenia as an EU member state managing the EU border, our 
findings resonate with a broader issue of crimmigration in Europe and beyond.
Empirically, the paper draws on interviews conducted with the main actors in-
volved in crimmigration procedures: state representatives, non-governmental orga-
nizations and migrants. The main part of the paper thus offers an analysis of the 
position and viewpoint of the key stakeholders on crimmigration policies – their per-
spectives of the migration management system, institutions and procedures, how 
they assess this experience and what their policy proposals are. We were thus able 
to associate the policy measures as envisioned by state actors with their immediate 
effects both in the form of implementation by public employees in charge of enfor-
cing the law, as well as in the form of crimmigration consequences as experienced by 
the targets of its measures – the migrants themselves.
The criminalization of migrants is “currently written into a neoliberal/neoconser-
vative political framework based on the asymmetry of power and wealth between 
actors that are all-powerful, and weak ones who have no rights” (Palidda 2011: 2). In 
conclusion, we wish to reiterate that much of contemporary migration, especially 
the so-called migration crisis, represents an integral aspect of North-South relations, 
and any
policy in this area is doomed to failure unless it addresses the causes of both eco-
nomic and forced migration in current patterns of global inequality […] The vast 
disparities of wealth and power in the emerging global order mean that not all citi-
zens are equal and that some passports are better than others. Such hierarchies may 
be the basis of a new system of global economic stratification, in which migration 
– in all its guises – is a key element. In this context, migration control is really about 
regulating North-South relationships and maintaining inequality. (Castels 2010: 223)
In these processes Slovenia is part of a wider geographical and political framework, 
which means that using law and policy in Slovenia as a case study can provide a 
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better understanding of the wider EU context. Nevertheless, we could offer only a 
limited overview of crimmigration processes, and further research is needed that 
would employ a critical comparative perspective with Slovenia’s international legal 
commitments. There is also a lack of analyses that would study the responses of poli-
tical elites and competent institutions in relation to specific migration topics, as well 
as analyses of certain procedures related to crimmigration in Slovenia, such as the 
further examination of border control, ethnic profiling, pushbacks and deportations.
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POVZETEK
KRIMIGRACIJE V SLOVENIJI
Veronika BAJT, Mojca FRELIH
Avtorici v članku obravnavata »krimigracijo« (tj. kriminalizacijo migracij) v Sloveniji. 
Raziskujeta elemente kriminalizacije migracij v pravnem okviru, institucijah in politi-
kah. Uokvirjanje tematike na normativni ravni, tj. na ravni institucij, analizirata skupaj 
s pregledom izvajanja konkretnih postopkov v praksi. Analizo političnih in strokov-
nih mnenj tako združujeta z analizo učinkov, ki jih imajo krimigracije na migrante in 
migrantke. Empirični del članka temelji na dvanajstih poglobljenih polstrukturiranih 
intervjujih. Izkušnje oseb, ki migrirajo, s krimigracijskimi ukrepi namreč dodatno po-
trjujejo, da migracijska politika v Sloveniji, tudi kot posledica izvajanja smernic EU, 
postaja strožja in vedno bolj usmerjena v povečevanje kriminalizacije migracij.
Prispevek je prvi celoviti pregled stanja in zapolnjuje vrzel v raziskavah kriminali-
zacije migracij v Sloveniji. Pristop h kriminalizaciji migracij je sociološki, poudarek pa 
na aktualnem trendu konstrukcije migrantov kot »simboličnih napadalcev« oziroma 
kršiteljev zakona. Z analizo posledic povečane uporabe ukrepov kazenskega prego-
na za obravnavo »problematike migracij« članek ponazarja socialnoekonomsko iz-
ključenost in zanikanje človekovih pravic migrantk in migrantov. Avtorici raziskujeta, 
ali migracijska politika v Sloveniji postaja strožja in gre v smeri povečane kriminaliza-
cije migracij, v kolikšni meri gre za posledico izvajanja širših politik EU oziroma koliko 
je širši okvir EU bistven tako za razumevanje sedanjega stanja kot tudi za napove-
dovanje prihodnjih trendov. Izvajanje krimigracijskih politik, kot sta npr. povečan 
nadzor meja in prisilno vračanje, povzroča diskriminacijske učinke in nespoštovanje 
pravic migrantov. V kontekstu vloge Slovenije kot države članice EU, ki upravlja zu-
nanjo šengensko mejo, so ugotovitve avtoric odsev širših vprašanj krimigracijskih 
procesov v Evropi in drugod.
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